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Abstract
The integration of cloud computing into vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has allowed the possibility of offering
multiple services to the vehicle owners ranging from safety to entertainment services. The ubiquitousness of cloud
computing involves a multitude of service providers; thus, an efficient and secure access control mechanism is
required. However, rigorous security features need to be addressed for such commercial-based services to be fully
adopted. In this paper, we present a secure billing protocol over attribute-based encryption in vehicular cloud
computing. We achieve the identity privacy of the vehicles and their requested services through pseudonym
techniques. Certificateless signature scheme is used to assure the authentication of legitimate vehicles which can
enjoy the provided services. We use attribute-based encryption to guarantee access control based on the purchased
services. We make use of hash chain technique to provide authorization through electronic voucher (credits) which a
vehicle has to possess in order to purchase a service. Unlike existing protocols in VANETS, the proposed protocol is not
built on expensive bilinear pairing operations. We provide the efficiency of the proposed protocol through
performance analysis and simulation.
Keywords: Access control, Attribute-based encryption, Certificateless signature scheme, Vehicular cloud computing
1 Introduction
Combining cloud computing (CC) with vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) to form vehicular cloud computing
(VCC) appeals the existing cloud service providers (CSPs)
such as Amazon EC2, S3, Microsoft Azure to also extend
their services to vehicle users. Taking advantage of the
vehicle’s on-board unit (OBU), the vehicle users would
have additional computing resources to enjoy various
services from safety to infotainment-related services. In
conventional cloud computing, CSPs usually offer a pay-
per-use billing system in their pricing model which means
that a user will only be charged for exactly the amount of
services provided. A vehicle user can acquire the services
on the move using the OBU’s visual and computational
capabilities. As pointed out by Li et al., a key success of
commercial applications over vehicular environment will
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inevitably be featured by entity authentication and billing
while simultaneously embracing the vehicle mobility [1].
Basic security requirements in VCC have been
addressed such as entity authentication, authorization,
and privacy [2, 3]. Existing literature has more focused
on access control mechanisms which allow a CPS to
provide multiple services within a single package [4–6].
To enforce access control in different services, attribute-
based encryption (ABE) has widely been adopted to offer
a number of services embedded within a single package
[4, 5]. Even though ABE ensures that a service is accessed
by a legitimate user, bad-intentioned vehicle user might
over use the services as long as the access structure per-
mits it. Thus, secure billing feature is required in order
the vehicle users to strictly access what they consent to
pay for. Secure billing systems which provide evidence
to the vehicle user when it comes to payment need to be
considered for a full adoption of the commercial services
in VCC.
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Among the relevant works with secure billing feature
in VANETs, Yeh et al. proposed a local and proxy-
based authentication and billing protocol in order to
reduce the communication overhead. Their protocol pro-
posed an incentive-aware multi-hop forwarding tech-
nique for vehicles in the VANETs [7]. The protocol
did not consider secure access control which is indis-
pensable for CSPs within the VCC architecture. In
another work, Yeh et al. proposed a portable authentica-
tion/authorization/accounting (AAA) framework for pur-
chasing services from the road entities (RSUs). They used
signature-based and key policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (KP-ABE) in their billing mechanism to achieve local-
ized fine-grained access control [4]. However, in their
protocol, the systemmaster secret keymust be distributed
to every vehicle temper proof device. Therefore, in case
the temper proof device is compromised, the system secu-
rity features are affected [8]. Moreover, these protocols
are built based on expensive pairing operations which will
hinder the whole system efficiency since the CSPs would
also provide voluminous files such as mp3 files or movies.
In this paper, we present a secure billing protocol over
attribute-based encryption in vehicular cloud computing.
The identity privacy of the vehicles and their requested
services is achieved through pseudonym techniques. We
make use of certificateless signature scheme to assure
the authentication of legitimate vehicles which can enjoy
the provided services [9]. ABE is adopted to guaran-
tee rigorous access control based on the provided access
structure [10]. Hash chain technique is to used to guaran-
tee the authorization property through electronic voucher
which a vehicle has to possess before enjoying any giving
service [11].
1.1 Motivation and contribution
The vehicles on the move need also to enjoy a variety of
services provided by the CSPs as individuals do through
the smart phones. Additionally, the vehicles on the move
are predicted to easily and efficiently enjoy the CSP’s ser-
vices due to the technological features such as visual,
computing, and networking in-built capabilities. How-
ever, the CSP owners have to make sure that the vehicle
users pay for the provided services along with additional
security properties which need to be met before the adop-
tion of the commercial services in VCC. We describe our
contributions as follows:
• We first present an application model for a secure
billing protocol over attribute-based encryption in
vehicular cloud computing which allows the vehicle
users to enjoy a variety of service on the move. We
define the security requirements to be met by the
proposed protocol.
• We present a secure billing protocol over
attribute-based encryption in vehicular cloud
computing based on the techniques of attribute-based
encryption, secret sharing scheme, certificateless
signature scheme, and hash chain technique.
• We apply electronic voucher (credits) feature in the
system to restrict the vehicles from over using the
acquired access structure in order to enjoy the
embedded services. Thus, a vehicle is not prompt to
enjoy a given service in a limited time. The electronic
coin boosts the confidence of the CSPs over
non-repudiation of payment.
• We provide analysis of the proposed protocol in
terms of security objectives. We further evaluate the
performance of the proposed protocol through
computational delay, transmission overhead, and
simulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
first present the related work and the preliminaries in
Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. We present the sys-
tem architecture of the proposed protocol in Section 4
and the design of our protocol in Section 5. We discuss
the security analysis and performance of the proposed
protocol in Section 6 and finally conclude in Section 7.
2 Related work
In this section, we present the related work which is subdi-
vided into two sub-sections.We first present the evolution
of vehicle communication architectures from the conven-
tional VANET framework to vehicular cloud computing
extensions along with related security mechanisms. Then,
we present the existing work on billing schemes within the
CC environment and VCC.
2.1 VANET architecture
VANET result as an extension of mobile ad hoc netwoks
(MANETs) [12]. In VANETs, the main entities represent
the vehicles, RSUs, and an over-viewer third party called
Trusted Authority (TA) in charge of registration, certifica-
tion, and revocation of all the entities within the VANET
architecture [13]. Conventional VANETs avail two major
communication means through the dedicated short-range
communication (DSRC) as V2V and V2I communications
[14]. A considerable number of applications were pre-
dicted to be achieved through the VANET architecture;
however, the computational cost of the value-added appli-
cations in VANETs require huge computation capabilities
which led to the mixture of VANETs and cloud computing
[15].
Vehicular cloud was introduced by Olariu et al. for the
first time [16]. An extension of their work suggested an
autonomous vehicular cloud (AVC) architecture as a spe-
cial case of VANET cloud [17]. Hussain et al. defined three
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types of architectures which originated from the combina-
tion of VANETs and cloud computing [18]. VANETs using
cloud is defined as vehicles equipped with smart devices
and communicating with the cloud the same way as our
mobile phones connect to different servers located in the
cloud. Vehicular cloud refers to the full utilization of vehi-
cle devices as computers to form mobile servers. In this
architecture, one could use the vehicle OBU’s to make
his/her personal cloud.Hybrid vehicle cloud is a combina-
tion of the above architectures also referred as VCC. The
feasibility of VCC was adopted by several researchers [19,
20], though security issues within the cloud computing
are still an attractive on-going research whereby different
secure protocols have been proposed [21]. In this work,
we construct our protocol based on VANETs using cloud
architecture.
2.2 Secure billing schemes
A billing transaction refers to the saving of the the move-
ment logs in order to verify the billing operations. Billing
transactions are part of electronic payment schemes.
Time-based billing and content-based billing are the main
billing approaches in cloud computing and depend on the
type of required services. However, several CSPs seem
to embrace content-based billing rather than time-based
billing [22]. A considerable number of electronic payment
schemes have been suggested in the literature. Among
them are micro-payment-based schemes such as MiniPay
and Netpay [23]. These e-payment systems allow the users
of cloud-based applications to securely and efficiently per-
form payments. These schemes are built using one-way
hash functions that generate chains of hash values. The
cloud users will first release several hashes with the hash
chain in order to perform billing transactions. On the
basis of the micro-payment-based scheme, Pay-as-you-
Browse [24] and XPay [22] fused the micro-payment con-
cept into cloud-hosted services. Though those schemes
have less billing latency, they do not support additional
security features required for billing transactions in cloud-
based services.
Within the vehicular environment, secure billing feature
is core prerequisite for a full adoption of commercial-
based services by the CSPs in VCC. Several billing mech-
anisms have been proposed for VANET applications [4, 7,
25, 26]. In [7], Yeh et al. proposed a local and proxy-based
authentication and billing scheme to reduce the commu-
nication overhead. The protocol proposed an incentive-
aware multi-hop forwarding for the vehicles within the
VANET architecture. They adopted batch verification
technique in their scheme to fulfill the security require-
ments and signature-based communications. However,
the protocol does not satisfy access control property, thus
cannot allow multiple services in a single package. In [4],
Yeh et al. proposed a portable AAA framework which
allow the vehicle users to enjoy CSP’s services from the
RSUs. They used signature-based and KP-ABE in the
billing protocol to attain localized fine-grained access con-
trol and also employed E-coin to provide service autho-
rization. However, the proposed protocol is built based on
expensive pairing operations which might not be efficient
due to voluminous sizes of various files.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the basic properties of
lightweight attribute-based encryption (lABE) based on
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and
certificateless signature scheme which form the basic
cryptographic primitives of the proposed protocol.
3.1 Lightweight ABE scheme
The lABE scheme of [10] based on elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy consists of Setup, Encryption, Key-Generation, and
Decryption algorithms.
3.1.1 lABE.Setup
Suppose that the attribute space of the system is defined
as the universe of attributes U = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let G be an
additive group with a prime order q and P ∈ G, where G
consists of points on an elliptic curve and P is a generator
of G. lABE.Setup() algorithm generates lABE parameters
as follows:
1. Choose a random s ∈ Z∗q as the attribute master
secret key and computes the corresponding public
key PK = s · P.
2. For each attribute i ∈ U , choose an attribute secret
ti ∈ Z∗q and compute the attribute public key
Pi = ti · P.
3. Set amk = {s, t1, . . . , t|U|} and






Given a message m, an attribute set ω, and labe.params,
lABE.Encrypt(m, ω, labe.params) outputs the cipertext
CM as follows:
1. Choose k ∈ Z∗q and compute the key K = k · PK .
2. Compute C = EncK (m).
3. For each i ∈ ω, computeWi = k · Pi, respectively.
4. Return the cipertext CM = 〈ω,C, {Wi | i ∈ ω}〉
3.1.3 lABE.KeyGen
For the given master secret amk and the access tree ,
lABE.KeyGen(amk, ) algorithm generates secret shares
of the decryption key for the encryptedmessage under the
attribute set ω.
Nkenyereye et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:196 Page 4 of 12
1. For the access tree , assign index to each node other
than root.
2. For each node, a polynomial qnode(x) over Z∗q is
defined in top-down manner where each polynomial
is of degree dnode − 1 and dnode is the threshold value
of the node.
• for the root, set qroot(0) = s.
• for other nodes including leafs, set
qnode(0) = qparent(index(node)) where
index(node) is the index value of the node.
3. Let n be the number of leaves in , for each leaf node
leafl (1 ≤ l ≤ n), a secret share of the decryption key
is computed as Dleafl = qleafl (0) · t−1i where i is the
attribute associated to leafl and ti is the random
number for i chosen in lABE.Setup.
4. Return D = {Dleafl | leafl ∈ }
3.1.4 lABE.Decrypt
The decryption algorithm lABE.Decrypt(CM, D,
labe.params) decrypts the cipertext CM, if and only if
the attributes set ω satisfies the access tree , by using
NodeKey(CM, D, node) for a node in the access tree
recursively. In the lABE scheme [10], secret sharing based
on Lagrange interpolation [Shamir] is used to reconstruct
the decryption key.
1. For each leaf node to which an attribute i is
associated, NodeKey(CM, D, leafl) is defined as
follows:
• if the associated attribute i to leafl is not
included in ω, then NodeKey(CM, D, leafl) = ⊥.
• otherwise,
NodeKey(CM,D, leafl) = Dleafl · Wi
= qleafl (0) · t−1i · k · Pi
= qleafl (0) · t−1i · k · ti · P
= qleafl (0) · k · P
2. For a non-leaf node u, it calls NodeKey(CM, D, z) for
all children z of the node u.
• Let ωu be an arbitrary du sized set of children
nodes such that NodeKey(CM, D, z) = ⊥.
If no such set exist NodeKey(CM, D, u)
returns ⊥.





be the Lagrange coefficient where



















×qu(index(z)) · k · P
= qu(0) · k · P
3. Calculate the decryption key K = NodeKey(CM, D,
root) = qroot(0) · k · P = s · k · P.
4. Return the decrypted messagem = DecK (C).
3.2 Certificateless signature scheme
The certificateless signature (CLS) scheme of [9] consists
of the following algorithms.
• CLS.Setup() algorithm generates a master key and
public system parameters as follows:
– Choose an additive group G with a prime
order q and a generator P ∈ G defined on an
elliptic curve.
– Select master secret key s ∈ Z∗q and computes
the master public key Ppub = s · P.
– Choose two cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Z∗q and
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × G3 → Z∗q .
– Set public system parameters





• CLS.SetSecret(id ) outputs a secret value for the given
identity id as follows:
– Select randomly xid ∈ Z∗q as a secret value and
compute Pid = xid · P.
– Return S1 = 〈xid,Pid〉
• CLS.PartialKey(x, id, Pid) generates a partial private
and public key for the id as follows:
– Choose a random rid ∈ Z∗q and compute
Rid = rid · P.
– Compute sid = rid+s·H1(id,Rid,Pid) (mod q).
– Return S2 = 〈sid,Rid〉 as the partial private key.
• CLS.SetKey(S1, S2) sets skid = 〈xid, sid〉 and
pkid = 〈Pid,Rid〉 as the private key and public key for
the entity of id, respectively.
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• CLS.Sign(m, skid) generates the signature for a
message m as follows:
– Choose a random l ∈ Z∗q such that gcd(l+h, q)
= 1, where h = H2(m,R,Pid,Rid) and R = l · P.
– Compute r = (l + h)−1(xid + sid) (mod q).
– Return the signature σ = 〈r,R〉.
• CLS.Verify(m, id, pkid , σ ) verifies the signature σ for
the message m under the id as follows:
– Compute h1 = H1(id,Rid,Pid) and
h2 = H2(m,R, id,Pid,Rid).
– Check if r ·(R+h2 ·P) ?= Pid+Rid+(h1 ·Ppub).
4 Proposed protocol
In this section, we first present the system architecture
of the proposed protocol. Secondly, we present the secu-
rity requirements of the proposed protocol, and lastly, we
outline the main phases of the proposed protocol.
4.1 Architecture
We describe the communication entities within our pro-
tocol which are made of Trusted Authority (TA), Service
Providers (SPs), Road Side Cloud (RSC), and vehicles
which communicate through the OBU as shown in Fig. 1:
• TA: It is in charge of the registration of all entities
(RSC, SPs, and vehicles) inside our system and issues
cryptographic materials during the system
initialization.
• RSC: RSCs are databases located along the roads and
accessible by the vehicles. The RSCs store the service
files (SFs) provided by the SPs. In that case, the
vehicles can acquire the files through the RSCs. The
vehicles get the electronic voucher from SPs through
the RSCs. Due to the advancements of technology,
we assume that RSCs are connected to an electricity
power generator with enough computational
capability.
• SPs: It is a server located in the cloud belonging to a
cloud-based commercial service providers (CSPs).
SPs offer a range of services, and one service package
can incorporate several services such as mp3 audio, a
map, or a short video clip. SPs send their service files
to RSCs so that the vehicles can easily download
them. However, in order to convince the vehicles of
the services they need to be charged for, TA provides
an electronic voucher with a given value which a
vehicle has to satisfy in order to get the services.
Moreover, the electronic voucher logs are sent to TA
in non-rushing hours for accountability and
non-repudiation of payment.
• Vehicles: Vehicles are equipped with OBUs which
allow them to communicate with RSCs in order to
require files from the SPs.
4.2 Security objectives
Our protocol should satisfy the following security require-
ments:
• Authentication and authorization: Each vehicle
should be authenticated before it can receive a service
file from SPs through the RSCs. Additionally, only
Fig. 1 System architecture
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legitimate subscribers should get access to use SP’s
services.
• Identity privacy preservation: The real identity of a
vehicle should be kept secret from other vehicles,
RSC, and SPs.
• Fine-grained access control: Through fine-grained
access control based on ABE, a vehicle should strictly
be able to open a service corresponding to its access
structure.
• Double-spending resistance: A vehicle should not
over use its purchased electronic voucher to open
additional files.
• Non-repudiation of payment: A vehicle should not
deny the electronic voucher which it has used to
open a given file. This would help in case of disputes
over billing issues.
• Traceability: TA should be able to reveal the real
identity of SPs and vehicles.
The proposed protocol consists of the following sub-
protocols:
• System Setup: TA sets up its master secret key and its
corresponding public key. Each vehicle provides its
real identity, and TA generates the corresponding
pseudo identity from which a partial private key is
computed. SPs and RSCs also provide their real
identities, and TA computes their partial private keys.
Each SP generates the service files along with their
access structures. SPs send securely the attribute
master key of each file to TA. SPs also send the
service files to RSC along with the corresponding
secret keys which will be used for E-voucher
generation through hash chain technique.
• E-voucher Generation: Periodically, a vehicle
registers for SP’s services. During the registration, the
vehicle specifies the service files it wishes to acquire.
Then, TA generates an electronic voucher (EV)
which contains the secret shares corresponding to
the access structure which the vehicle registered for.
E-voucher will work as a transaction evidence for the
purchased services.
• Service Purchase: RSCs periodically advertise the SP’s
services. vi can request of any service among the
advertised services. Depending on the E-voucher
balance, RSCj first computes a new value of EV based
on the requested services and sends the services to vi
along with the secret shares corresponding to the
access structure of the requested service.
5 Proposed description
In this section, we design a secure billing protocol over
attribute-based encryption in vehicular cloud computing.
Table 1 shows the notations used in describing the pro-
posed protocol.
Table 1 Notations and descriptions
Notation Description
G Elliptic curve group with the same order q
P ∈ G A generator ofG1
skid , pkid private, public key pair of an entity X
ti SP’s master secret for each attribute i
amk SP’s attribute master key
Ti Public key for each attribute i ∈ U
aliasvi vi ’s pseudonym
U Universe of attribute
 Access tree
ω Attribute set
D Set of secret share Dleafl in
SFj Service file
ATj Access tree corresponding to SFj
Enck(.) Symmetric encryption under key k
5.1 System setup
In setup phase, TA generates global system parameters
and any other entities register to the TA as follows:
1. TA chooses an elliptic curve group G of order q and
a generator P ∈ G.
2. To generate master secret skTA and public key pkTA,




CLS.Setup(), then publishes cls.params.
3. For registering each vehicle vi, TA assigns a
pseudonym aliasvi to each vi.
4. Each RSCj and SPk registers to the TA and generate
CLS private keys as follows:
• RSCj and SPk generate S1,RSCj ←
CLS.SetSecret(RSCj) and S1,SPk ←
CLS.SetSecret(SPk), and requests partial private
key to the TA, respectively.
• TA issues S2,RSCj ← CLS.PartialKey(skTA, RSCj,
PRSCj ) and S2,SPk ← CLS.PartiaKey(skTA, SPk ,








CLS.SetKey(S1,SPk , S2,SPk ), respectively.
5. Similarly, each vi generates S1,vi ←
CLS.SetSecret(aliasi), TA issues S2,vi ←
CLS.PartKeyExtract(skTA, aliasi, Pvi ), then vi sets〈
skvi , pkvi
〉 ← CLS.SetKey(S1,vi , S2,vi ).
In addition, each service provider SP prepares service
files served under a given access structure as follows:
1. SP decides the universe of attributes U = {1, . . . ,N},
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lABE.Setup(), and publishes labe.params to the
system.
2. Let l be the number of service files. SP decides access
tree ATj and prepares encrypted service file SFj
(1 ≤ j ≤ l) under a given attribute set ωj as SFj ←
lABE.Encrypt(filej, ωj, labe.params).
3. SP picks a secret key α to be shared with TA and
RSCs and provides〈
amk,α, {SFj | 1 ≤ j ≤ l}, {ATj | 1 ≤ j ≤ l}
〉
to RSCs
and α to the TA securely.
5.2 E-voucher generation
Periodically, the vehicles request an electronic voucher
(EV ) which permits to enjoy the services offered by any
SPs through the RSCs. To acquire an EV from TA, vi
performs the following:
1. vi composes an electronic voucher request message
EVR = {aliasi,K , ts} where ts is the time stamp and
K is a secret key to be used later.
2. vi sends C1 = EncPKTA{EVR, pkvi , δi} to the TA,
where δ is the signature for the EVR set as δi =
CLS.Sign(EVR, skvi ).
3. Upon receiving the message C1, TA first decrypts C1
using its private key, then verifies the signature as
CLS.Verify(EVR, aliasi, pkvi , δ). If it holds, TA
generates E-voucher (EV) as follows:
• Let d be the maximum credits for vi to purchase
service files. Compute hkd = hashd(α) where
hashd() represents the d-th hash chain, i.e.,
hkd = hash(hashd−1(α)) =
hash(hash(. . . (hash(α)) . . .)).
• Generate
EV = 〈aliasi, exp, d,MAChkd (aliasi|exp|d)〉
where exp is the expiration date.
4. TA sends C1 = EncK (EV ) to vi. Then, vi can recover
EV by decrypting the C1 under the shared secret key
K.
5.3 Service purchase
A vehicle after getting the EV can enjoy file services from
any chosen RSCj. RSCj advertises periodically the services
along with their denomination value dˆ.
1. From service file lists advertised, vi chooses a list for
SF ′j and composes a service request message
mf = {SF ′j ,EV , aliasi, pkvi ,K ′, ts} where K ′ is a secret
key to be shared with RSCj, and sets δj ←
CLS.Sign(mf, skvi ). vi sends C2 = EncPKRSCj (mf , δi) to
RSCj.
2. RSCj decrypts the C2 and verifies the signature δi as
CLS.Verify(mf, aliasi, pkvi , δi). If it holds and the
balance d ≥ dˆ,
• Compute hk′ = hashd(α) and check if
MAChk′(aliasi|exp|d) ?= MAChkd (aliasi|exp|d).• Generate a new E-voucher
EV = 〈aliasi, exp, d′,MAChkd′ (aliasi|exp|d′)〉
where d′ = d − dˆ and hkd′ = hashd′(α).
• Set D¯ ← lABE.KeyGen(amk, ATj).






4. vi decrypts C3 to recover EV and D¯, and runs
lABE.Decrypt(SFj, D¯, labe.params) to get the original
file of SFj.
6 Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed protocol based on the security analysis, the com-
putation delay, the transmission cost, the communication
overhead, and simulation.
6.1 Security
According to the aforementioned security objectives, we
analyze and discuss the security of the proposed protocol.
• Authentication: The authentication of each vi
requesting a service file is guaranteed by the
certificateless signature scheme on message
EVR = {aliasi,K , ts} with
C1 = EncPKTA{EVR, pkvi , δi}. No adversary can forge
a valid signature due to the hardness of DL problem.
Otherwise, the verifier could check the validity of the
message EVR by running CLS.Verify(m, id, pkid , σ )
to check if r · (R + h2 · P) ?= Pid + Rid + (h1 · Ppub).
Thus, the proposed protocol provides message
authentication.
• Authorization: Any vehicle has to be acquire a
electronic voucher before it can use SP’s service. vi
sends C1 = EncPKTA{EVR, pkvi , δi} to the TA to
request electronic voucher. After a successful
verification, TA sends C1 = EncK (EV) where
EV = 〈aliasi, exp, d,MAChkd (aliasi|exp|d)〉 as vi’s EV
which allows the vi to access SP’s services.
• Identity privacy preservation: An attacker cannot
obtain a real identity of a vehicle throughout our
proposed protocol. During the registration phase of
the vehicle by TA, each vehicle vi is given a pseudo-
identity aliasvi . Even though the attacker captures the
EVR request message EVR = {aliasi,K , ts}, the only
plain identity of vi available is its pseudo-identity
aliasvi . In the remaining protocol’s operations, the
only available information of vi is its pseudo-identity
aliasvi . We conclude that the proposed protocol
guarantees identity privacy preservation.
• Fine-grained access control: In our protocol, the
service file C3 = EncK ′(EV|D¯) which is sent to vi is
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first encrypted under a shared symmetric key K ′.
Moreover, unless a vehicle possesses the required
secret shares Dleafl = qleafl (0) · t−1i from ATj, the
vehicle cannot reconstruct the root node R to be able
to get the secret qroot(0) · k · P = s · k · P. During the
decryption phase based on the root or child node,
unless vi possesses the required secret shares, the
decryption process output ⊥. Thus, even the vehicles
which share a number of attributes cannot collude
together to recover the secret which allow the
decryption of the service file.
• Double-spending resistance: A vehicle cannot over
use its access structure to enjoy beyond what its
electronic voucher can allow. Before RSCj sends a
service file to vi, a new value of E-voucher
EV = 〈aliasi, exp, d′,MAChkd′ (aliasi|exp|d′)〉 where
d′ = d − dˆ and hkd′ = hashd′(α) is generated. Thus,
we confirm that the proposed protocol is resistant to
double spending of E-voucher.
• Non-repudiation for payment: A vehicle cannot deny
of using the services because a log message is
attached to ensure that the vehicle transactions are
saved. Moreover, though the RSC does not control
the electronic spending of vi, it keeps records of the
number of turns E-voucher has been regenerated.
• Traceability: Even though it is hard for an attacker to
know the real identity of a vehicle, TA has the
capability of revealing the vehicle’s real identity in
case of disputes. TA makes a search to find which
real identity corresponds to any given or reported
aliasvi . We conclude that the proposed protocol
satisfies the traceability property.
6.2 Computational delay
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our pro-
tocol in terms of computational delay. Note that we
ignore the time complexity involved in setup because it is
assumed to be done offline and occasionally. We mainly
consider the operations that dominate the speed of sig-
nature generation and signature verification such as one
point multiplication, one pairing operation over an ellip-
tic curve, asymmetric encryption, asymmetric decryp-
tion, symmetric encryption, signature generation, and
signature verification. We neglect all other small opera-
tions such as additions. We consider the implementation
parameters in [27, 28] with embedding degree 6, with
{G, q} represented by 161 and 160 bits, respectively. The
implementation was executed on a 3.5-GHz, core i-5,
16GB RAM desktop computer. The obtained results are
shown in Table 2.
As described in Section 3.2, vi sends a request for SP’s
file by computing h = H2(m,R,Pid,Rid), R = l · P, and
r = (l + h)−1(xid + sid) (mod q) which equals to 2Tmul.
Table 2 Measurement of cryptographic operations
Notation Operations Time (ms)
Tpair Bilinear pairing 2.82
Tmul Point scalar multiplication 0.78
Tas−enc Asymmetric encryption 1.17
Tas−dec Asymmetric decryption 0.61
Ts−enc Symmetric encryption 0.51
Ts−dec Symmetric decryption 0.55
Th Execution time of a general hash function 0.0001
RCSj computesWi = k ·Pi and qleafl (0) · t−1i , which equals
to (I + 1)Tmul where I is the number of attributes for
the requested files. During the service purchase phase in
Section 5.3, to recover the main secret based on the secret
shares, vi computes qleafl (0) · k · P which equals to dTmul
where d is the number of nodes in the access structure.
The E-voucher verification and regeneration is similar for
both vi and RSCj which equals to Th. If we set the num-
ber of attributes (I = 5) and the number of leaf node
(d = 5), then the computational cost equals to 9.36 ms for
the proposed protocol and 40.2 ms for PBS [4]. The overall
computational cost is illustrated in Table 3.
6.3 Number of transmission RSCs
Taking into consideration the computational delay on vi
and RSCj, we investigated the number of transmission
RSCs that are needed to send a file (based on the size)
which will influence the predictive handoff protocols to
be adopted [29]. We consider the following settings to
simulate a practical scenario [30]:
• The average velocity of a vehicle (denoted v) ranges
from 10 to 40 m/s (36–144 km/hr).
• The valid coverage range of an RSC (denoted CRSU) is
300 to 600 m.
• The data rate α of a service channel can be up to
54 Mbps,
• The vehicle density (denoted de) of an RSC on
two-lane two-way streets varies from 50 to 150
vehicles.
• The service files size (denoted s) is assumed to weight
from 0.5 to 20 Mbytes. The files may contain maps,
mp3, mp4, or videos.
Table 3 Computational cost [4] of and proposed protocol
Scheme phase PBS: [4] Proposed
Access control on vi (d + 2)Tpair + 3Tmul (1 + d)Tmul
Access control on RSCj (1 + I)Tmul (1 + I)Tmul
Billing on vi Tpair + 3Tmul Th
Billing on RSCj Tpair + 7Tmul 3Th
(d number of leaf node, I set of attribute)
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Let η be the probability that each vehicle issues a service
request, and let X be a random variable representing the
number of requesting vehicles among a total of de vehi-
cles. As a result,X follows a binomial distributionB(de, η),
and we have:





ηx(1 − η)de−x, x = 0, 1, 2, . . . ., de







ηx(1 − η)de−x = de · η
The RSC verifying the service requests will estimate
how many RSCs are needed (denoted NRSC) to trans-
mit the requested file. We measure how much time
(denoted TReq) is required for a service file as TReq =
s × 1024 × 1024 × 8 × E(X)
α × 54 × 1024 × 1024 = s × de × η × 8α × 54 .
We then compute NRSC = (Tvi + TRSC) × v × TReqCRSC whereTvi and TRSC represent the computational overhead of vi
and RSCj, respectively, as shown in Table 3.
We further compare our protocol with existing scheme
[4] which considers privacy, access control, and billing fea-
tures. As noted in [4], PBS protocol requires 10 RSCs to
complete forwarding a service of 20 Mbytes. However, in
the same circumstances, the proposed protocol requires
only 2 RSCs as shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
6.4 Communication overhead
In this section, we analyze the communication overhead
of the proposed scheme. The sizes of the elements are
64 × 2 = 128 bytes for pairing based operations and
20 × 2 = 40 bytes for ECC-based elements [31]. The
sizes of the general hash function’s output and time stamp
are 20 and 4 bytes, respectively. Compared to [4], the
proposed protocol offers lower communication overhead
Fig. 2 Required number of RSCs for PBS [4]
Fig. 3 Required number of RSCs for proposed protocol
since PBS [4] is build based on expensive pairing opera-
tions. The total message size is 70 bytes for the proposed
protocol in which we consider that the access structure 
contains 5 nodes (I = 5).
6.5 Simulation
Additionally, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed protocol through simulation.We used VANET-SIM
simulator for vehicle mobility coupled with ns-3 simulator
for network simulation [32]. We further set our scenario
based on the IEEE 802.11p VANET platform range which
is 2.56 Mbps in highly populated street such as high-
ways that use DSRC, to a maximum transmission range
of 6 Mbps. We consider a city scenario with a map down-
loaded fromOpenStreepMap database [33] with a random
speed for the vehicles ranging from 10 to 40 m/s (36–
144 km/hr). The details of the simulation are shown in












where NReqV is the number of vehicles requesting for SP’s
services andNRSC is the number of roadside clouds. TSendvi
is the time at which vi sends a request to RSCj and TRecvvi
is the time at which vi receives a response from RSCj. The











where NSRecvvi is the number of service files received by vi
from RSCj, andNRRecvRSCj is the number of requests received
by RSCj. NRSendvi is the number of requests sent by vi to
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Table 4 Simulation settings
Tools/parameter Value/specification
Mobility generation tool VANETSIM 2.02
Network simulation tool ns-3
Trans range 6 MBps
Number -of -vehicle 100
Simulation time 200 min
Wireless protocol 802.11a
Departure interval 200 min
RSU radius 600 m
Mobility model shortest path
Message size for [4] 109 bytes
Message size for proposed 70 bytes
RSCj and NSSendRSCj is the number of service files sent by
RSCj to vi.
We investigate the effect of the number of vehicles on
the average delay. As described in [4], we consider 100
vehicles with a probability of launching a SP’s service
request equals to 0.5 (η = 0.5). The number of attributes
of each access structure ATj is set to 5 (I = 5). The aver-
age delay based on the vehicle’s density is around 0.39 for
100 vehicles for PBS [4] whereas it is 0.21 for the proposed
protocol as depicted in Fig. 4. This occurs due to the time
which vi has to wait before it receives an SP’s service which
depends on the verification and regeneration of E-voucher
as shown in Table 3. In Fig. 5, the proposed protocol per-
forms better when we investigate the average delay based
on the speed of vehicles. For a normal speed ranging from
10 to 35 m/s, the average delay is 0.35 for the PBS [4] and
0.11 for the proposed protocol.
When we study the impact of vehicle’s density on the
average loss ratio, the proposed protocol performs better
Fig. 4 Impact of vehicle density on average delay
Fig. 5 Impact of vehicle speed on average delay
with 0.18 for 100 vehicles compared to PBS [4] with 0.25
for the same settings as shown in Fig. 6. We further inves-
tigate the impact of vehicle’s moving speed on the average
loss ratio. As shown in Fig. 7, the loss ratio is 0.19 for
vehicles moving from 10 to 30 m/s in PBS protocol [4]
whereas it is 0.09 for the proposed protocol in the same
conditions.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a secure billing protocol over
attribute-based encryption in vehicular cloud computing.
We used pseudonym techniques to achieve the iden-
tity privacy of the vehicles and their requested services.
Certificateless signature scheme is applied to assure the
authentication of legitimate vehicles which can enjoy the
provided services. We adopted ABE to guarantee rigorous
access control based on the purchased access structure.
Fig. 6 Impact of vehicle density on average loss ratio
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Fig. 7 Impact of vehicle speed on average loss ratio
We used hash chain technique to provide authorization
property through electronic voucher which a vehicle has
to possess before enjoying any giving service. Security
analysis and experimental results based on transmission
overhead, average delay, and average loss ratio are pro-
vided. Compared to relevant existing work under the same
scenario, the proposed protocol achieves efficient billing
features with less computational overhead for vehicular
cloud computing.
In the future, we will continue to investigate on revo-
cation technique based on the updating of the access
structure rather than the vehicle’s identity-based revoca-
tion.
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